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Abstract:  
Selection into private schools is the principal cause of bias when estimating the effect of 
private schooling on academic achievement. By exploiting the generous public 
subsidizing of private high schools in the province of Québec, the second most populous 
province in Canada, we identify the causal impact of attendance in a private high school 
on achievement in mathematics. Because the supply of highly subsidized spaces is 
much higher at the high school level than at the grade school level, 60% of transitions 
from the public to private sector occur at the end of grade school, we assume that these 
transitions are exogenous with respect to changes in transitory unobserved variables 
affecting math scores conditional on variables such as changes in income and child 
fixed effects. Using data from Statistics Canada’s National Longitudinal Survey on 
Children and Youth (NLSCY), we estimate the effect of attending a private high school 
on the percentile rank and a standardized math test score with different models (child 
fixed-effect, random-effect and a pooled OLS) and restricted samples to control for the 
degree of selection. The results, interpreted as a treatment on the treated effect show 
that the effect of changing schools, from a public grade school to a private high school, 
increases the percentile rank of the math score between 5 and 10 points and by 
between .13 to .35 of a standard deviation depending on the specifications and samples. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Improving the performance of children in mathematics and reading is a key public policy 
objective in the United States as well as in Canada. Since the end of World War II, global free 
trade has substantially increased the level of competition between firms in wealthy industrialized 
nations. A well-trained work force can only improve the strategic position of these firms by 
increasing the level of worker productivity. It is well known that schooling has historically played 
a very important role training the work force. Given these facts, a tremendous amount of research 
on schooling choices and on the impact of these choices on earnings has been done over the last 20 
years. An empirical debate on the best policy to increase the level of achievement of students has 
become a perennial topic of debate for both policymakers and social scientists. A recent book 
presenting the points of view of James Heckman and Alan Krueger (2004) on this matter is 
particularly revealing. Heckman refutes the claim, interpreting the evidence on this topic, that 
reducing class sizes is an effective policy for improving schooling achievement. Krueger argues 
the opposite. 
In another area of research, some recent work by Hoxby (2000) has shown that a more 
competitive schooling market where parents have a larger set of choices can improve the academic 
performance of children. This paper presents new evidence supporting this claim. 
Most empirical work on the impact of schooling choices made by parents for their children on 
academic achievement encounters the problem of spurious correlation of parental choice and 
achievement as unobserved variables such as parental tastes for the quality of education are 
correlated with both parental choice and achievement of children in school. 
In the United States, abstracting from the current wave of research on whether vouchers, 
charter schools, and other reforms that increase choice in education improve the quality of 
education, many influential studies have estimated the effects of Catholic secondary schooling on 
test scores, high school completion rates, and college attendance. Neal (1997, 1998) reviews the 
long history of research in this area, and Altonji et al. (2005a, 2005b) provide an overview of the 
discussion and references to the literature. These schools established across the nation are the 
largest and most homogeneous group of schools within the private sector and are found in a 
variety of geographical environments (urban, suburban and rural).1 Results from multivariate 
regressions support the evidence that Catholic schools on average are conducive to superior gains 
                                                     
1 According to the Annual Data Report of the National Catholic Association, the United States had 7,498 Catholic 
schools in 2006-07, including 6,288 elementary schools and 1,210 secondary schools. In total there were 2,320,651 
students, including 1,682,412 students in the elementary/middle schools and 638,239 in high schools. 
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in attainment and achievement in comparison with the relevant public counterparts. However, one 
can argue that despite the numerous controls included in these analyses, private schools and their 
students are different by some unmeasured characteristics that lead to better schooling outcomes. 
These unmeasured traits may explain selection into private schools and the direct effects on 
student’s performance. Families who dedicate some of their resources to pay for private school 
attendance signal a preference for education. To minimize the positive bias of selection on the 
estimated effects of private schools, researchers have used a variety of exclusion restrictions such 
as religious affiliation, geographic proximity to Catholic schools, and the interaction between them 
to identify private school effects using IV methods. Altonji et al. (2005b) evaluate the validity of 
instrumental variable strategies and conclude “that none of the candidate instruments is a useful 
source of identification of the Catholic school effect, at least in currently available data sets”. In 
another paper (2005a) they develop new estimation methods using the degree of selection on the 
unobserved variables to assess the effect of attending a Catholic high school on a diversity of 
outcomes. They find no evidence of an effect on test scores, but conclude that private schools do 
have positive effects on high school completion rates and college attendance decisions. 
This paper addresses the issue of selection into private schools by exploiting the relatively 
generous public subsidizing of private high schools in the province of Québec, the second most 
populous province in Canada, to identify the causal impact of attendance in a private high school 
on achievement in mathematics without the use of instrumental variables. Because the supply of 
private high schools is much higher than for grade schools for historical reasons and that they are 
highly subsidized, 60% of transitions from the public to the private sector occur at the end of grade 
school, we assume that the transition from public to private schools are exogenous conditional on 
variables such as income and child fixed effects. Using data from Statistics Canada’s National 
Longitudinal Survey on Children and Youth (NLSCY), we estimate the effect of private high 
school attendance on the percentile rank and a standardized measure of a math test score with 
different models (child fixed-effect, random-effect and a pooled OLS) and restricted samples to 
control for the degree of selection. To the observed socio-economic covariates including a family 
functioning scale at different ages of the child as well as family income, we add in some 
regressions three behavioral scales to control for other potential confounders. The results show that 
the effect of attending a private school in Québec for those attending private schools in Québec 
(the treated) increases the percentile rank of the math score by between 5 to 10 ranks depending on 
the specification and samples. It remains possible that mechanisms such as Ashenfelter’s dip 
(1978) could be in play but, given our identification strategy and the results, we believe they are 
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marginal in terms of their impact on the estimated effect of private schooling on achievement in 
mathematics. 
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2, we trace the history of private 
schooling in the province of Québec and the uniqueness of the private school network among the 
other Canadian provinces. In section 3, we expose the econometric methodology that is used to 
identify the causal effect (treatment on the treated effect) of private schooling on math 
achievement. In sections 4 and 5, we detail the Canadian NLSCY data set used, and describe the 
explanatory variables in the model. We also present descriptive statistics as an introduction to 
Section 6 where the estimates of the effects of private school attendance are presented. The last 
section concludes with the policy implications of our results. 
 
2. Québec’s private schools 
 
This section describes the changes of Québec’s education system over time and highlights its 
distinctive features compared to the education system of the other Canadian provinces. We present 
the sources of revenues of Québec’s private schools, the evolution over time of the number of 
students enrolled in public and private schools, and, finally, the measured gaps in test scores 
between the students of these schools. 
Among all the ten Canadian provinces, Québec has the most extensive sector of private 
schools. Table 1 shows the number of students in public and private primary and secondary 
schools for the school year 2003-2004 in Québec and in the four other Canadian provinces who 
dedicate public funds to private schools as well as total subsidies. In the other five provinces there 
are also private schools, but they are not subsidized and enrolments are very low (see also Table 8 
below). 
In Québec, the tradition of subsidizing private schools has a long history. From the 1950s to the 
end of the 1960s, most subsidized schools were “classical elite colleges” (the study of Latin or 
Greek was mandatory as well as Philosophy). The curriculum lasted 8-years following the 
completion of primary schooling after which graduates had access to university education and, in 
particular, to professional faculties such as medicine, law, dentistry, optometry, pharmacy, etc. 
Otherwise, graduates from public schools, after 12 years of schooling, had access to a more limited 
number of university programs (4-years for a university diploma). For “classical” college 
graduates obtaining a university degree took two years for most non-professional programs. At the 
end of the 1960s the Québec government substantially modernized the education system. Public 
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kindergarten was created; the number of grades in primary school was reduced from 7 to 6 years; 
the number of grades in secondary school was also changed from 6 to 5 years; most “classical 
private colleges” became public colleges (and new ones were created over the years).2 Québec’s 
colleges form a distinct schooling level compared to the schooling system in the other provinces. 
In Québec, high school graduates must choose between two tracks: 2-years general college 
programs giving access to all university programs (3-years long to obtain a first degree)3 or 3-
years long professional/technical colleges programs (all the 52 public colleges offer the two 
tracks)4 that form skilled technicians who can also access university. Finally a new network of 
public universities5 was created in Montreal (the largest city) and over all the regions. 
In the rest of Canada, the education system is slightly different from that of Québec: K-12 to 
graduate from high school (K-11 in Québec). A high school graduate can choose between a 
community college (1- to 4-years of study to obtain a college diploma which also gives access to 
university) or university (3 to 4 years for a bachelor’s diploma) whereas, in Québec, admission to 
university is conditional on being a college graduate. Another important difference between 
Québec and the other provinces concerns the tuition fees paid by students. Québec’s public 
colleges have no tuition fees but charge ancillary fees of the order of $2006 to $300 per year. In the 
other provinces, community colleges also have ancillary fees associated with their various 
programs but their tuition fees amount to approximately $2,500 per year, which is, on average, 
half of university tuition fees for most programs. 
With the changes brought to the Québec’s education system, the public financing of private 
schools was also revised in the early 1980s. Two rules were adopted. Firstly, and abstracting from 
a “capital subsidy” for installations, the subsidy for operating costs7 per student given to private 
schools is revised each year according to the subsidy per student given to public schools by level 
of education (kindergarten, primary, secondary, college). Secondly, the percentage of operating 
costs covered by the subsidy was lowered from 80% to approximately 60% for all schooling 
                                                     
2 Many of these “classical” schools were run by the catholic order (brothers, sisters, priests) although most of the 
teachers were secular. The Catholic Church was a very important player in Québec Society until 1960. The best 
private high-schools were almost all catholic and a large number operated throughout the province. Therefore, because 
of historical reasons the supply of private high schools is relatively high in Québec. 
3 Except medicine and some professional programs who all have a mandatory one-year internship. 
4 There are 24 subsidized private colleges who offer mainly the general program. 
5 All universities in Canada and Québec are public. In Québec, all universities receive the same subsidies per student 
which are related to programs of study and tuitions fees are fixed by the government. The tuitions fees in Québec are 
half the mean fees in the other provinces. 
6 All monetary amounts throughout the text are expressed in Canadian dollars. 
7The operating costs consist mainly of teachers and non-teaching salaries and other costs except the location value of 
premises. 
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levels. Table 2 presents the subsidy to private schools by schooling level. For school year 2004-
2005, the subsidies per student for a kindergarten, primary, secondary school and college, are 
respectively, $3,006, $2,582, $3,556 and $4,757, to which the government adds respectively $93, 
$93, $139 and $514 per student for installations. Hence, the subsidy per student in private 
secondary schools is considerably larger than for private primary schools. 
Evidently, the sources of revenues differ between Québec’s public and private schools. Table 3 
shows the sources of revenues for public and private schools for school year 2004-2005. For 
private schools, almost half of the operating expenses are covered by subsidies and a third is 
generated by registration, admission, and school fees. Moreover, the government requires that the 
fees of subsidized private schools not exceed the subsidy per student. Table 4 shows the authorized 
maximum fee according to regulation and the actual maximum fee charged by private schools by 
schooling level. Very few private schools fix their fees to the maximum permitted. Administrative 
statistics (not shown here) for 169 subsidized private schools indicate that, on average, the fee is 
68.3% of the authorized maximum fee and that this gap varies by region (from 39% to 84.3% in 
Montreal), which suggests that families are price sensitive and that the market is competitive. 
All private schools must have a permit delivered by Québec’s Ministry of Education to operate. 
The Ministry treats the demands, renewals, and modifications to the permit which specifies the 
maximum number of students in the school’s premises. To be accredited and to receive subsidies, 
the curriculum must be approved. The students in grades 4 and 5 of secondary private schools 
must also take the standard French, English, History, Math, and Physics exams of the Ministry, as 
do the students of public schools. Almost all private schools are subsidized (see Table 1). They 
represent approximately 90% of the primary and secondary private schools. Two “types” of 
private schools are not subsidized. The first type consists of a few “elite” primary and secondary 
schools who offer enriched curricula and high levels of pedagogical supervision as well as other 
activities. All are in the metropolitan region of Montreal. Their schooling fees are much higher 
than the maximum permitted to be a subsidized school. The second type, the majority of 
unsubsidized private schools, consists of “commercial” schools or colleges which offer very 
specific low-skill training (hairdressing, secretarial skills, paramedical assistants, travel agent, 
etc.).8 In school year 2003-2004, private schools are distributed as follows by education level: 130 
at the primary level, 140 at the secondary level, 59 at both the primary and secondary levels, 24 at 
the college level (16 offer both the secondary and college levels). Hence, the majority of private 
                                                     
8 Most of the technical skills training are also offered in public schools which all have centers of training for manual 
occupations. 
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schools are found at the secondary level of education. By comparison, there are 2,434 primary and 
secondary public schools, 52 public colleges, and all the 19 universities are public. Although there 
are only 69 more private secondary level schools than private grade schools, secondary level 
schools are much larger, thus explaining the much larger supply of private high-school places 
compared to grade school. For school year 2007-2008, there were 89,000 students enrolled in 
private secondary schools and 32,000 students in private primary schools; for public schools the 
enrolments were respectively, 395,000 (secondary level) and 446,000 (primary level). 
Table 5 presents the number of students enrolled in Québec’s public and private schools, by 
education level and for the school years 1994-95 to 2007-08. The statistics show a declining trend 
of total enrollment in public schools at the primary and secondary levels in Québec. This trend is 
similar in Canada and can be explained by the declining rates of fertility over the years. In 
contrast, there is an upward trend in the private sector at the primary and secondary levels, but not 
at the college level. The private enrollment ratio varies by province as can be seen from column 3 
in Table 1 (and in Table 8). One Québec student out of ten is enrolled in the private sector. Only 
British Columbia has a similar rate. A rapid calculation from Montréal’s School Board statistics 
indicates that more than 20% of students are enrolled in private primary and secondary schools. 
For the purpose of this study, it is important to stress the fact that few Québec families enroll their 
child in a private primary school. For the school year 2004-2005, the last year of available survey 
data for our study, only 5.7% of Québec’s students are in a private school at the primary level. On 
the other hand, almost one out of five (17.5%) students is in a private school at the secondary 
level. 
 
Outcomes in public and private schools 
School performance can be measured by high school graduation rates, the average number of 
years used to obtain a high-school degree, and access to postsecondary education (college and 
university). Along all these dimensions, private schools do better than public schools. 
Québec’s Ministry of Education administers unique exams in French and English, History, 
Math, and Physics, for students in grades 4 and 5 of secondary level schools. As of June 2005 and 
for all schools, the overall average score and pass rate in these exams were, respectively, 73.3% 
and 83.3%. In private schools, the overall average score was 80.8%, compared to 71.4% for public 
schools. The pass rate was 80.6% for public schools and 94.5% for the private schools. For the 
2002 cohort, 53% of students in public schools obtained their high school diploma after 5 years 
(the “normal” length after primary school) compared to 83% for students in private schools. For 
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colleges (general or technical), a study by Riopel (2004) shows that, for the 1997 to 2002 cohorts, 
the graduation rates in private schools were higher, for men and women by 19.2% and 14.5% 
respectively. For the 2001 cohort, according to the Ministry of Education, 85% of students in 
private university transfer programs (general college) obtained a diploma after 4 years compared 
to 70% in public colleges; for the technical colleges; after 6 years the rate is 61% for private 
colleges compared 64% for the public colleges.9 
A contentious issue in the public debate about educational choices is the role of selection, 
based on academic performance, into private schools. Opponents of the use of public funds to 
finance private schools, especially the Association of Public School Boards, argue that the higher 
performances of the private sector are the “natural” result of the selection of “highly skilled” 
students. If an important fraction of “bright students” enroll in private schools, there is a decline in 
both the overall quality of public school students and of the performance of the lesser-skilled students 
remaining in public schools (the “cream skimming effects”). Finally, opponents to the 
subsidization of private schools argue that an objective comparison of the academic performances 
of public and private schools requires comparing students from the same socio-economic 
backgrounds. 
Private schools can and do select their students.10 In a 2006 document on admission, the 
Federation of private schools reports that “70.0% of students who took an admission exam for 
grade one of secondary school were admitted, 17.6% had their application rejected because of 
space limitations, and 5.4% have been turned away because the school did not have the specialized 
human resources to respond to the special needs of these students” (p.3). This suggests that almost 
25% of the candidates have seen their applications in private schools rejected because of their 
results at the entrance exam. Another 2005 survey of the Federation (FEEP, 2006), shows that 
many institutions have a waiting list for admission to their secondary level schools. Selection is 
practiced when admissions are higher than available spaces. From the survey (124 respondents of 
the 150 institutional members), half declare that they accept all students and the other half report 
that they must reject applications because of space considerations. 
 
                                                     
9 The Ministry does not present separate statistics for private and public college graduates pursuing a university 
education. For year 2005-06, 78% of general college graduates entered a university program without interruption; the 
percentage for graduates in a technical college is 25%. 
10 The selection process is less severe at the primary school level. The schools who offer both the primary and 
secondary levels generally admit to the secondary level a student that is enrolled at the primary level if she succeeds. 
The tradeoff for families is school fees that must be paid for many (six) years since the admission policy of these 
“integrated” schools favors entrance in grade 1 of primary school. 
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Competitive actions taken by the public schools 
In the 1990s, School Boards who administer the public schools reacted more vigorously to the 
flight of students to private schools by offering selective and particular pedagogical projects to 
keep more skillful students, and more attractive programs, selective or not to, from the point of 
view of parents and students. The number of public schools where all the school is dedicated to a 
particular project is small: 16 in all; 4 with an international program; 5 with an “enriched” 
program; 1 with a foreign language program; 3 with an arts program; 2 “alternative” schools and 1 
school for high school drop-outs. On the other hand, more schools have developed a within school 
particular project. For example, according to administrative data for school year 2005-2006, 93 
public high schools have adopted an international program. Table 6 presents the number of 
students in primary and secondary public schools enrolled in particular pedagogical projects by 
type. Unfortunately, in our data set we cannot distinguish those students on the basis of private or 
public schooling. We consider the reactions of the public schools as a competitive response to the 
quality and diversity of programs offered in private schools. 
 
3. Analytical framework 
Endogeneity is the most important econometric problem one encounters when trying to 
measure the effect of private schools on children’s academic performance. In other words, 
nonrandom selection into private schools is an issue most studies on the subject try to tackle, in the 
absence of experimental data. The unobservable background characteristics of most students may 
thus lead parents to enroll their child into a private school. Moreover, characteristics of private and 
public schools are likely to influence their effectiveness. 
Obviously, OLS regressions will produce a positively biased effect of private schooling on 
math scores or ranking, children from wealthier families being drawn to private schools. Even 
controlling for income, OLS estimates are biased. Children in private schools live with parents 
who on average place a high value on education. We will use a child fixed effect regression 
method to compute consistent estimates of this effect. 
Our identification strategy is simple. It is based on the idea that moving from a public grade 
school to a private high school in the Province of Québec is uncorrelated with changes in 
unobserved variables during that same time period. We believe that the principal cause that 
explains the relatively large (compared to other jurisdictions across Canada) transitions between 
public grade school and private high school is the large increase in the supply of inexpensive 
private school places when the child transits to the high school level in Québec. Therefore, we rule 
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out spurious effects caused by mechanisms such as Ashenfelter’s Dip that would bias the 
estimated effects of private schooling using panel data and child level fixed effects. 
For example, a spurious effect will be estimated with a child fixed effect method if parents 
from higher income households, following a potentially temporary dip in school grades reacted by 
sending their children to private school. A positive effect of private schooling would simply reflect 
a return of students to their normal levels of achievement. Without ruling out that such a 
mechanism is playing out in areas with high fees for attending private schools, we surmise that it 
plays a very small role in the case of a sample of children who are moving in a private school in 
Québec as they leave grade school in the sixth grade. 
As we stressed in the last section, the subsidy per student of Québec’s private high-schools is 
more important than that of its private elementary schools and the supply of places is much higher. 
Moreover, this variation in the subsidy or supply of places does not depend on any unobservable 
characteristics of children. It is thus equivalent to an exogenous change in private schools spaces 
and prices. As families are price and supply sensitive, this variation explains why the percentage 
of students enrolled in private schools is more important in high-schools than at the elementary 
level. Hence, measurements of the effect of Québec’s private schools on the academic 
performance of Québec’s children should not suffer from simultaneity bias with a child-fixed 
effect estimation method. 
Table 7 shows that a very large proportion of Quebec children in our sample (described in the 
next section) move to the private schooling sector after grade school in reaction to the large 
number of private schools available at the high school level as shown in the preceding section. Out 
of 224 children transiting from public to private school in our sample, 60% are observed transiting 
from grade school to public school. We assume that a sample of children composed of children 
observed in grade school in one cycle of the NLSCY and in high school the next will be less 
sensitive to Ashenfelter’s dip and will provide us with credible causal estimates of the effect of 
attending private school on achievement in mathematics. It is our contention that instrumental 
variable estimation or control function estimations are not necessary for the special case of 
Québec. 
Our modeling strategy to capture the effect of private schools on academic performance is 
progressive and simple. First, we select all of the NLSCY’s children aged 7 to 15 years with at 
least two math scores.11 This measure of academic performance is regressed on socio-economic 
                                                     
11 A child’s math scores may not be consecutive scores, that is a child may drop out of the survey for one or more 
waves and then reappear. 
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covariates including a private school dummy variable and child fixed effects. Practically we 
estimate the parameters of the following child fixed-effect model using the panel features of the 
NLSCY: 
iaiiaia eXprivateT +++= μβα   *  . (1) 
 
Where iaT  is child i’s percentile math score at age a; private a dummy variable equal to one if the 
child attends a private school; iaX  the observed socio-economic covariates at age a, including 
household income and a constant; iμ  is the child’s fixed effect; and iae  the residual. The 
vector iaX  may be “augmented” to include three behavioral scales that measure a child’s 
hyperactivity (hyperactive-inattentive), anxiety (anxiety and emotional disorder), and aggression 
(conduct disorders-physical aggression). Including these behavioral scales is an additional means 
to control for a possible endogeneity problem that might bias our estimate of the effect of private 
schools on children’s academic performance. 
After estimating the model with all children who have at least 2 math scores, we restrict our 
sample by considering only children at the end of primary school (5th and 6th grades) and at the 
beginning of secondary school (7th and 8th grades). The first sample should be more prone to bias 
due to Ashenfelter’s dip because children may change from a public to a private school after 
experiencing a transitory bad period in school. The second sample provides a variation in the 
private schooling variable that is exogenous to temporary variations in unobserved factors related 
to achievement levels in school. 
In addition to the child fixed-effect model (1), we also estimate a random-effect model and a 
pooled OLS model to observe the bias present in methods that do not provide a control for 
selection. Because of the probable heterogeneity of the effect of attending a private school on 
achievement, we interpret our estimated effect of private schooling as an effect of the treatment on 
the treated that is the effect of private schools on children who attend private schools. 
 
4. Data set 
 
The data used for our empirical analysis are provided by Statistics Canada’s National 
Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY) which is a probability survey designed to 
provide information about children and youth in Canada. The survey covers a comprehensive 
range of topics including childcare, schooling, physical development, learning and behavior as 
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well as data on their social environment (family, friends, schools and community). The NLSCY 
began in 1994-1995 and data collection occurs biennially. The unit of analysis for the NLSCY is 
the child or youth. Information concerning each selected child between 0 and 17 years of age and 
the family are provided by the person most knowledgeable (PMK) of the child. The PMK was 
usually the child’s mother (more than 90% of the time), but it could also be the father, a step-
parent or an adoptive parent who lived in the same dwelling. 
A sample of 22,831 children, aged 0 to 11 years was selected in Cycle 1 (1994-1995) of the 
survey, in each of the 10 provinces, making up the longitudinal sample. To reduce the response 
burden on families with several eligible children, the number of children selected was limited to 
two per family in Cycle 2 (1996-1997). Therefore, some children were dropped from the original 
sample (16,903 children remained in the longitudinal sample). The rule changed to one child per 
household without exception in Cycle 5 (2002-2003). Because of the design of the survey no 
separate analysis using longitudinal data fixed-effect sibling analysis can be conducted. The last 
data set available is Cycle 6 (2004-2005), where the oldest children are aged from 18 to 21 years. 
The test is administered to children who were at least enrolled in their second grade school 
year and aged from 7 to 15 years.12 Therefore, not all children from the original longitudinal 
sample (1994-1995) can be used for this paper’s estimations. Moreover, since the natural age 
progression of a child between surveys is two years, only children aged at least 3 in the first wave 
were retained in our database. A child aged 3 in the 1st cycle with a “normal” age schooling 
progression of two years between cycles will be 5 in the 2nd cycle, 7 in the 3rd, 9 in the 4th, and so 
on. Because the test is taken at age 7 and for children at least in second grade school some can be 
observed with more than two math scores at a different schooling level.13 We use data on children 
aged 7 to 15 with at least two test scores. 
 
Math scores 
The CAT/2 test is a shorter version of the Mathematics Computation Test taken from the 
Canadian Achievement Tests, 2nd edition. The CAT/2 is designed to measure basic skills in math 
(addition, subtraction, multiplication and division on integers, etc.). The master files present both 
the CAT/2-raw and –standardized scores. The raw score is simply the number of correct answers 
to the test. The difficulty of the test varies with the schooling grade of the child. Thus, there are 
                                                     
12 All the 16- and 17-year-olds pass take once a different math test (reading comprehension, problem-solving and 
decision making). 
13 In Cycles 2 and 3, there was both a Math and a Reading test. In Cycle 4, only the math test was administered. The 
reading test was removed because of time constraints. It was decided that only one test could be administered. The 
math test was chosen as it had been administered in all previous cycles. 
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different tests depending on the school-level the child is in. Statistics Canada standardizes the raw 
scores using a sample of Canadian children from the ten provinces which is called the normative 
sample. This sample was chosen by the Canadian Testing Center. The standardized scores are 
obtained using sub-samples (by schooling-grade) of the normative sample. 
A significant proportion (approximately 35%) of children in two school grades obtained a 
perfect score when they passed the tests in 1994-1995 (cycle 1 of the survey). Therefore 
subsequent cycles added more versions of the tests. These “newer” versions of the tests were still 
based on the school-level of children but with a clearer distinction made between school years. For 
example, in 1994-1995, children in their second and third school years (who are 7 and 8 years old) 
took the level 2 test. Two years later, children of the same ages took two different tests: the level-2 
test for children in their second school year (7 years old) and the level-3 test for children in their 
third school year (8 years old). Hence it is possible that children of different ages passed the same 
test in a particular cycle. Preliminary results with the standardized scores (presented in Table A3) 
showed strong negative period effects. Given Statistics Canada’s interpretation of the scores, this 
translates into a serious deterioration in math achievement across Canada. Because this made little 
sense, considering that the math mean performance of the 15-year-olds Canadians in successive 
OECD’s PISA’ surveys (2004, 2007) has not declined, the Hazen method was applied to calculate 
another dependent variable for math achievement, percentile ranks based on the standardized 
scores. The percentile ranks are always calculated with regard to the level of the test the child 
passed and for each cycle of the NLSCY used. We also use as an alternative dependent variable, 
because the percentile rank variable is truncated, the math score in units of a standard deviation 
(standardized to have a mean 0 and a standard deviation 1). Finally, we also measure the 
sensitivity of the results to outliers by dropping children with math scores in the first and last 5% 
of the distribution of scores. 
We have fewer observations for cycles 1 to 3 compared to cycles 4 to 6; because of the way 
Statistics Canada conducted the test. The test was administered by the child’s teacher once the 
PMK of the child and the School Board had given consent. For cycle 1, the NLSCY received 
results for about 50% of eligible children; for cycle 2, the percentage was 74% and for cycle 3, it 
was 54%. Since cycle 4 of the NLSCY, in order to minimize the time dedicated by teachers to the 
survey and to avoid disturbing class activities at the end of the school year, the math test is 
administered at the home of the child rather than in school, and almost all eligible children are 
observed with a test score. 
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5. Control variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Tables A1 and A2 present the means of the socio-economic control variables (characteristics 
of the children, PMK and families) respectively for the overall sample, and the restricted sample 
with children who are transiting from grade school to high school. For child characteristics, we 
control for age in months, gender, if repeated last grade, has a chronic condition, changed school 
(other than transition from public to private school), and scores on three behavioral scales 
constructed by Statistics Canada: child’s hyperactivity (hyperactive-inattentive), anxiety (anxiety 
and emotional disorder), and aggression (conduct disorders-physical aggression). For children 
aged 7 to 9 the behavioral scores are reported by the Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK) of the 
child, generally the child's mother. For children aged 10 to 15 the scores are self reported. For the 
PMK, we control for age, level of education, non-immigrant status, family type, age and number 
of siblings, size of community and family income (2001 dollars). A family functioning score is 
also used as a control.14 This scale provides a global assessment of family functioning and an 
indicator of the quality of the relationship between parents or partners. The total score varies 
between 0 and 36, a high score indicating family dysfunction. 
 
6. Econometric results 
 
We start our analysis with the results obtained with the percentile rank of the child for the math 
test presented in Table 9. We present OLS, Random-effects and Fixed-effects estimates of the 
effect of private school attendance on rank and with two specifications (without and with 
behavioral scores added to the socio-economic control variables). For sample 1 (first panel) which 
includes all public and private school children, all estimates of the private school effect are 
statistically significant with the OLS estimate being the largest, as expected given that unobserved 
factors affecting private school choice are correlated with achievement (e.g. parental involvement 
in education). The child fixed effect estimate is considerably lower but shows that private 
schooling can make a difference for children with parents who choose private schooling as we find 
that the effect is approximately 5 percentile ranks. 
 
                                                     
14 As stated in the NLSCY’s user guide for the first survey (1994-1995): “This scale was administered to the Person 
Most Knowledgeable (PMK) of the child, generally the child’s mother, or to the spouse/partner on the Parent 
Questionnaire, and measures how family members relate to each to other.” More precisely: “Questions related to 
family functioning were developed by researchers at the Chedoke-McMaster Hospital of McMaster University and 
have been used widely both in Canada and abroad. This scale is used to measure various aspects of family functioning, 
e.g. problem solving, communications, roles, affective involvement, affective responsiveness and behavior control.” 
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Our second set of estimates (sample 2, second panel of Table 9) are obtained with children who 
are observed in either the fifth grade or sixth grade at the primary level and then in the next wave 
in high school. Unfortunately, there is a gap of one grade because of the children of the NLSCY 
are observed every two years. This sample should be the least affected by a mechanism such as 
Ashenfelter’s dip. Here, OLS estimates and fixed effect estimates are very similar. This occurs 
because very few children are in private school at the primary level. Hence, almost all the variation 
in the private schooling variable occurs at the secondary level. The results show a very strong 
effect of private schools increasing the percentile rank of children who move to a private high 
school by 8 to 10 ranks. 
Adding the behavioral scores of the children has a very marginal impact on the estimated 
parameters of the private school effect. Hyperactivity and aggression are generally statistically 
significant variables, having a negative effect on the math scores. Whereas, anxiety has a positive 
impact of the percentile rank but is not significant for all cases. 
It is not clear why the effects are larger for this sample compared to the other. In the other 
sample, possibly more children move to private schools because they are nor performing 
adequately in the public system. The effect of private schools on those children could be smaller 
because they are already in difficulty and remediation at the high school level is more difficult. It 
is also possible that the effect is age dependent. It could be that the younger a child makes the 
transition to private high schools, the better the results as the brain is more plastic at younger ages 
and better equipped to deal with higher standards. Finally, it is possible that the effect diminishes 
over time. Public schools possibly increase the supervision of students as they approach their final 
years where compulsory exams are taken for completion of the high school degree. 
Because the percentile rank dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 100, we estimated the 
model using as dependent variable the number of standard deviations from the mean (for children 
taking the test at the same grade). It was possible in this case to perform estimations removing 
outliers (top and bottom 5 percent) from the sample as a test for robustness. The results are 
presented in Table 10. Samples referred to as samples 1, 3, 5 are the same as samples 1, 2 and 3 
used to estimate the rank percentile and produce similar to the results presented in Table 9. The 
samples 2, 4 and 6 are more restrictive with the exclusion of outliers. 
The estimated (positive) effects range from approximately 2 tenths of a standard deviation with 
the full sample to almost 4 tenths of a standard deviation for the most restrictive sample. When 
outliers are moved, the range of the effects drops to 15 percent to 30 percent of a standard 
deviation. 
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Our results show quite convincingly that private schools can considerably improve the 
achievement level of young teenagers. Although, we cannot affirm that randomly choosing a child 
in a public school and moving him to private school will improve his lot, we can affirm, given the 
credibility of our identifying assumptions, that parents that choose private schools are making a 
choice that on average will improve their children’s test scores and this at a relatively low cost for 
the family. 
These improvements are also achieved at a low cost for the provincial government. For school 
year 2004-2005, at the primary and secondary schools levels, the subsidies to the private sector are 
$416 millions to which $457 million from fees and other revenues (see Table 3), for total revenues 
of $874 millions. For the same year and school levels the public sector received, $6,131 millions 
of public subsidies, raised $1,233 millions in school taxes and obtained $757 millions in other 
revenues for total revenues of $8,120 millions. The public and private sectors respectively 
schooled almost a million students and a little more than a hundred thousand students. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper demonstrates that sending a child to a private school can, ceteris paribus, improve 
his ranking in mathematics. More precisely, it empirically supports the hypothesis that children 
who attend private schools in the province of Québec benefit from their parents’ decision to send 
them to this type of school (a positive effect of the treatment on the treated). The effect is large as 
it ranges from 5 to 10 percentile ranks and 15 to 40% of a standard deviation. Estimates we 
suppose suffer less from possible bias are in the higher range of effects. These effects, although for 
only one outcome, a score on a math test, are similar to the effects estimated for American 
Catholic schools. 
The evidence demonstrates the potential gains obtained from a competitive system of schools. 
For school year 2007-2008, private high schools educate 18% of high school students and 6.6% of 
grade school children in Québec. Table 6 shows that public schools have reacted to the flight of 
students to private schools by offering particular pedagogical projects mainly in urban settings. 
The long existence in suburban and urban settings of private schools points to the observation on 
outcomes that reflect long term effect of alternatives to public schools. 
Our results provide some evidence that subsidizing private schools could be a wise policy to 
improve performance. Because we use relative measures of performance, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether such a policy would increase average test scores, but given that children rank better once 
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they move to a private school could demonstrate that they are better prepared for tests, more 
motivated and possibly be putting more effort in academics. 
One of the main mechanisms that can justify these subsidies is the creation of a more 
competitive system with more choices for parents that can lift the quality of all schools. In fact, 
some evidence against the “cream skimming hypothesis” and for the “tide lifting all boats” 
hypothesis are the results presented in Table A4. When comparing the math scores for children at 
the same level of schooling in Québec and the Rest of Canada in public schools, we find that the 
children in Québec are on average doing better than those in the rest of Canada despite the fact that 
a much larger proportion of children are in private schools in Québec and are doing better than 
children in public schools. The sample of children in the Rest of Canada is much more 
representative of all children than the sample of children in public schools where the more talented 
children are underrepresented. Therefore, competition could be driving up scores in public 
schools. The difference between children in Québec and the rest of Canada is certainly not 
attributable to differences in income as the mean income of families with children in Québec is 
smaller than for the rest of Canada. 
What do these results suggest for policy purposes? The Québec experience shows that opening 
up public schools to more competition; with some subsidies to private schools as well as a 
regulated environment for these schools is a prudent way to raise performance within and across 
schools (elite public schools). To provide more fact-based precise suggestions for policy we need 
to answer directly the question of why private schools are more effective than public schools. 
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Table 1: Number and proportion of primary/secondary level students in public and private schools in 
the Canadian provinces that subsidize private schools, and total subsidies, 2003-2004 
Province Number 
in public 
schools 
Number in private 
(subsidized) schools 
Percentage in 
private schools 
(subsidized) 
Subsidy per student for 
eligible private school 
Total 
subsidies 
million $ 
Québec 989,838 115,200 
(106,681) 
10.4 
(9.63) 
Kindergarten: $2,976 
Primary: $2,578 
Secondary: $3,555 
Average: around 60% 
397 
Manitoba 188,498 14,290 
(12,861) 
6.51 
(5.89) 
Kindergarten: $1,690 
Primary: $3,381 
Secondary: $3,381 
Average: around 50% 
45 
Saskatchewan 174,263 2,627 
(1,655) 
1.36 
(0.86) 
Primary: $0 
Grade 9: $4,723 
Grades 10-12: $5,045 to $5,271 
8.3 
Alberta 552,592 28,500 
(27,209) 
4.81 
(4.59) 
Kindergarten: $2,227; 100% 
Primary: $2,672 $; 60% 
Grades 7-9: $2,672; 60% 
Grade 10: $3,058; 60% 
Grades 11-12: $4,580; 60% 
75-80 
British 
Columbia 
614,671 63,321 
(54,888) 
9.27 
(8.04) 
Category 1: $3,001; 50%; 72% 
of students in private sector 
Category 2 : $2,088; 35%; 15% 
of students in private sector; 
Weighted average: $2,837 
156 
Source: Marois (2005). 
 
 
Table 2: Public subsidy per student to Québec’s private schools by schooling level, selected years, in 
Canadian dollars 
Year Kindergarten schools Primary schools Secondary schools College 
1997-1998 2,275+82 2,092+82 2,919+122 NA 
1998-1999 2,297+82 2,108+82 2,944+122 NA 
2000-2001 2,496+85 2,292+85 3,179+122 NA 
2002-2003 2,807+88 2,421+88 3,331+131 NA 
2004-2005 3,006+93 2,582+93 3,556+139 5,271+514 
2005-2006 3,064+95 2,808+95 3,612+142 NA 
Note: The subsidy is based on teaching and non-teaching personel, other costs and location value of 
premises. 
Source: Department of Education Leisure and Sports (MELS), Budgetary Rules for Schools under 
Agreement, annual. 
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Table 3: Sources of revenues of Québec’s public and private subsidized schools in percentage, by 
schooling level, 2004-2005 
Revenues Primary and secondary 
schools 
Colleges 
Public sector 
Subsidies 77 86 
School taxes 14 - 
Admission, registration and schooling fees - 3 
Other revenues (gifts, profits from ancillary activities, etc.) 9 11 
Private subsidized sector 
Subsidies (including schooling ententes) 48 55 
Admission, registration and schooling fees 28 30 
Other revenues (gifts, profits from ancillary activities, etc.) 24 15 
Source: Department of Education, Leisure and Sports (MELS), Statistics of Education, 2005, p. 231. 
 
 
Table 4: Authorized and actual maximum schooling fees charged by Québec’s private schools, by 
education level, and school years 2003-04 and 2004-05 
Level Year Maximum fee 
according to regulation 
Maximum fee 
asked 
Number of schools 
with maximum fee 
2003-2004 $2,886 $1,650 Kindergarten 
2004-2005 $2,924 $1,679 
1 out of 48 
2003-2004 $2,488 $1,724 Primary 
2004-2005 $2,518 $1,813 
2 out of 72 
2003-2004 $3,421 $2,122 Secondary 
2004-2005 $3,464 $2,219 
2 out of 142 
Source: Department of Education, Leisure and Sports (MELS), Financial Reports of Subsidized Private Schools, and 
Budgetary Rules for Schools under Agreement, annual. 
 
Table 5: Student enrollment in Québec’s public and private schools, by schooling level, and by school 
year, 1994-1995 to 2007-2008 
Public schools Private schools School 
year Kindergarten Primary Secondary College Kindergarten Primary Secondary College 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
86,091 
91,307 
91,652 
91,001 
87,441 
85,053 
83,073 
80,006 
76,421 
72,223 
70,185 
69,344 
69,043 
68,906 
522,714 
520,882 
525,973 
531,816 
538,394 
544,452 
546,444 
543.546 
533,276 
517,996 
498,369 
478,772 
460,502 
446,141 
421,467 
415,491 
410,538 
404,333 
395,246 
382,648 
373,504 
370,197 
376,409 
385,139 
395,120 
401,407 
402,946 
394,673 
163,990 
160,405 
161,684 
158,032 
157,209 
150,055 
150,845 
144,111 
148,726 
147,817 
147,170 
148,093 
146,636 
151,658
3,821 
4,053 
4,167 
3,098 
3,786 
3,918 
4,010 
4,362 
4,303 
4,372 
4,421 
4,625 
4,776 
4,832 
24,681 
24,595 
24,847 
25,350 
26,155 
26,941 
27,831 
28,995 
29,462 
29,473 
29,917 
30,461 
31,101 
31,533 
76,839 
75,749 
74,885 
73,806 
72,837 
72,635 
73,343 
74,964 
77,913 
81,310 
84,066 
86,561 
88,203 
88,694 
16,979 
16,608 
16,528 
16,348 
15,064 
*12,074 
*11,805 
*11,606 
*11,097 
*10,381 
*10,924 
*10,834 
*10,953 
*12,045
Source: Department of Education, Leisure and Sports (MELS), Statistics of Education, annual. 
Note: Regular education, full-time and part-time students. *Subsidized spaces in colleges. 
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Table 6: Number of students in primary and secondary public schools enrolled in particular 
pedagogical projects by type, 2004-2005 
Type of program Number of students 
Regular program with arts (designated or concentration) 12,882 
Regular program with sports (designated or concentration) 
International program 
13,217 
24,317 
Regular program with computer science 2,681 
Regular program with foreign languages 14,370 
Regular program with sciences 2,518 
Regular program with a diversified project 4,244 
Alternative (non traditional) school 3,091 
Total 77,320 
Source: Higher Council of Education (2007) from the Department of Education, Leisure and Sports file on 
students’ enrolment. 
 
Table 7: Number of Transitions and Percentage of Total Number Transitions from Public to Private 
Schools, Québec, and cycles 1 to 6 of the NLSCY 
Transitions by schooling level1 Number % of Total 
In Primary School2,3 54 24 
In Secondary School2,4 36 16 
Between Primary and secondary 134 60 
Total 224 100 
Notes: 1 - Excludes the transitions from private to public schools (20 in all). 2 - Includes all children 
attending private schools for which we have no information on the type (Public/Private) of school attended 
in the previous school year. Otherwise the number of transitions is negligible in primary and secondary 
school (6 and 7 respectively). This excludes transitions from public to private schools between primary and 
secondary school. 3 - Primary school is defined as 2nd to 6th grade. 4 - Secondary school is defined as 7th to 
10th grade. 
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Table 8: Weighted number of primary and secondary school students in the public and private 
sectors by province and cycle of the NLSCY 
Regions Type of 
schools 
Cycle 1: 
1994-95 
Cycle 2: 
1996-97 
Cycle 3: 
1998-99 
Cycle 4: 
2000-01 
Cycle 5: 
2002-03 
Cycle 6: 
2004-05 
Québec Public 
Private 
% private 
389,035 
21,441 
5.22 
540,221 
45,413 
7.75 
665,036 
68,833 
9.38 
685,545 
72,682 
9.59 
631,457 
77,753 
10.96 
450,963 
81,130 
15.25 
 
Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, 
Alberta & British 
Columbia 
 
Public 
Private 
% private 
 
548,162 
26,034 
4.53 
 
789,440 
48,251 
5.76 
 
970,069 
61,347 
5.95 
 
 
924,861 
51,677 
5.29 
 
835,658 
50,684 
5.72 
 
629,206 
44,851 
6.65 
 
Newfoundland, 
Prince-Edward-
Island, Nova-
Scotia, New-
Brunswick & 
Ontario 
 
Public 
Private 
% private 
 
832,403 
32,728 
3.78 
 
1,191,455 
46,804 
3.78 
 
1,419,990 
36,498 
2.25 
 
1,410,145 
43,737 
3.00 
 
1,287,780 
41,332 
3.10 
 
985,282 
34,048 
3.34 
Total Public 
Private 
% private 
1,769,600 
80,203 
4.53 
2,521,116 
140,468 
5.57 
3,055,095 
166,678 
5.46 
3,020,551 
168,096 
5.57 
2,754,895 
169,769 
6.16 
2,065,451 
160,029 
7.74 
Note: Students are weighted by their longitudinal weight in each cycle. Source: Author’s calculation from 
micro-data cycles 1 to 6 of the NLSCY. 
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Table 9: Estimated Effects of Private Schools on Children's Math Percentile Rank Score, 7- to 15-year-olds 
children from cycles 1 to 6 of the NLSCY 
Variables OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Sample 1: All public and private schools children 
Private School1 8.15 (1.91)*** 8.46 (1.88)*** 5.07 (2.05)** 5.05 (2.24)** 6.88 (1.61)*** 6.76 (1.68)*** 
Behavioral scores2 
Hyperactivity - -3.83 (0.56)*** - 0.04 (0.65) - -2.61 (0.53)*** 
Anxiety - 1.03 (0.56)* - 1.31 (0.61)** - 1.05 (0.50)** 
Aggression - -1.62 (0.57)*** - -1.69 (0.61)*** - -1.79 (0.49)*** 
N (children) 4,403 (1,633) 3,885 (1,622) 4,403 (1,633) 3,885 (1,622) 4,403 (1,633) 3,885 (1,622) 
 
Sample 2: End of primary to first secondary grades transitions only 
Private School1 9.98 (2.73)*** 10.06 (2.83)*** 8.22 (2.53)** 10.46 (3.09)*** 8.62 (2.39)*** 9.06 (2.54)*** 
Behavioral scores2 
Hyperactivity - -4.34 (0.95)*** - -1.76 (1.37) - -3.81 (0.94)*** 
Anxiety - 0.31 (0.93) - 1.27 (1.22) - 0.35 (0.88) 
Aggression - -2.75 (0.91)*** - 0.51 (1.36) - -2.37 (0.87)*** 
N (children) 1,562 (766) 1,281 (743) 1,562 (766) 1,281 (743) 1,562 (766) 1,281 (743) 
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered on the individuals (child) in parentheses. Statistical significance: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 2- Each behavioral score is centered on its mean and divided by its standard deviation for each cycle. 
 24
Table 10: Estimated Effects of Private Schools on Children's Math Standard Deviation Score, 7- to 15-
year-olds children from cycles 1 to 6 of the NLSCY 
Variables OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Sample 1: All public and private schools children 
Private School 0.30 (0.07)*** 0.31 (0.06)*** 0.23 (0.07)** 0.22 (0.07)*** 0.27 (0.06)*** 0.26 (0.06)*** 
Hyperactivity - -0.13 (0.02)*** - 0.01 (0.02) - -0.09 (0.02)*** 
Anxiety - 0.04 (0.02)* - 0.05 (0.02)** - 0.04 (0.02)** 
Aggression - -0.05 (0.02)*** - -0.06 (0.02)*** - -0.06 (0.02)*** 
Obs. (children) 4,403 (1,633) 3,885 (1,622) 4,403 (1,633) 3,885 (1,622) 4,403 (1,633) 3,885 (1,622) 
  
Sample 2: End of primary to first secondary grades transitions only 
Private School 0.35 (0.09)*** 0.35 (0.10)*** 0.31 (0.08)** 0.38 (0.10)*** 0.31 (0.08)*** 0.32 (0.09)** 
Hyperactivity - -0.15 (0.03)*** - -0.05 (0.04) - -0.13 (0.03)*** 
Anxiety - 0.02 (0.03) - 0.04 (0.04) - 0.02 (0.03) 
Aggression - -0.10 (0.03)*** - 0.03 (0.04) - -0.08 (0.03)** 
Obs. (children) 1,562 (766) 1,281 (743) 1,562 (766) 1,281 (743) 1,562 (766) 1,281 (743) 
 
Sample 3: End of primary to first secondary grades transitions less first and last 5% of the distribution 
Private School 0.26 (0.08)*** 0.25 (0.08)*** 0.27 (0.11)** 0.27 (0.11)** 0.24 (0.07)*** 0.23 (0.08)** 
Hyperactivity - -0.10 (0.03)*** - -0.06 (0.04) - -0.10 (0.03)*** 
Anxiety - -0.01 (0.03) - 0.04 (0.04) - -0.01 (0.03) 
Aggression - -0.07 (0.03)*** - 0.01 (0.04) - -0.07 (0.02)*** 
Obs. (children) 1,267 (621) 1,040 (602) 1,267 (621) 1,040 (602) 1,267 (621) 1,040 (602) 
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered on the individuals (child) in parentheses. Statistical significance: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 2- Each behavioral score is centered on its mean and divided by its standard deviation for each cycle. 3- Based 
on the score distribution of math scores centered on their mean and divided by their standard deviation for each test level 
and each cycle. 
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Table A1: Mean Characteristics of Children (7- to 15-year-olds), their PMK and Family by Cycle, 
overall sample (all children) 
Characteristics Cycle 1: 
1994-95 
Cycle 2: 
1996-97 
Cycle 3: 
1998-99 
Cycle 4: 
2000-01 
Cycle 5: 
2002-03 
Cycle 6: 
2004-05 
Sample 242 531 513 1,042 1,171 904 
Child             
Age in Months 115 ± 16 129 ± 22 137 ± 31 126 ± 28 132 ± 26 152 ± 19 
Behavioral scores1             
Hyperactivity 5.02 ± 3.94 4.09 ± 3.40 3.93 ± 3.33 3.63 ± 2.97 3.96 ± 2.93 3.60 ± 2.78 
Anxiety 3.19 ± 2.92 3.20 ± 2.64 3.01 ± 2.60 2.94 ± 2.49 3.17 ± 2.52 3.06 ± 2.55 
Aggression 1.38 ± 1.85 0.97 ± 1.67 0.97 ± 1.88 1.07 ± 1.76 1.14 ± 1.87 0.76 ± 1.46 
Repeated her last grade2 0.09 [21] 0.05 [28] 0.05 [24] 0.06 [58] 0.06 [67] 0.04 [36] 
Changed school 0.22 [54] 0.13 [67] 0.13 [65] 0.14 [147] 0.13 [158] 0.11 [99] 
Is a girl 0.54 [130] 0.55 [292] 0.53 [270] 0.50 [518] 0.50 [583] 0.49 [443] 
Has a chronic condition  0.22 [54] 0.25 [132] 0.26 [135] 0.31 [325] 0.29 [335] 0.28 [251] 
PMK             
18 to 25 years old 0.23 [55] 0.22 [119] 0.24 [121] 0.21 [220] 0.22 [256] 0.21 [192] 
26 to 30 years old 0.48 [115] 0.45 [237] 0.43 [221] 0.43 [448] 0.43 [500] 0.42 [383] 
31 to 35 years old 0.25 [60] 0.27 [145] 0.27 [138] 0.29 [301] 0.28 [331] 0.29 [260] 
36 to 40 years old 0.05 [12] 0.06 [30] 0.06 [33] 0.07 [73] 0.07 [84] 0.08 [69] 
Primary Education 0.21 [51] 0.20 [108] 0.17 [86] 0.13 [139] 0.13 [157] 0.13 [113] 
Secondary Diploma 0.24 [57] 0.21 [112] 0.18 [93] 0.20 [204] 0.20 [234] 0.20 [182] 
Post-secondary 0.27 [66] 0.22 [118] 0.24 [123] 0.23 [243] 0.25 [289] 0.24 [216] 
University Diploma 0.28 [68] 0.36 [193] 0.41 [211] 0.44 [456] 0.42 [491] 0.43 [393] 
Non-Immigrant 0.97 [235] 0.97 [516] 0.97 [496] 0.97 [1,012] 0.97 [1,131] 0.97 [873] 
Family             
Family Functioning score 7.55 ± 5.49 7.63 ± 5.16 7.82 ± 4.60 8.19 ± 4.97 7.41 ± 4.94 7.26 ± 4.89 
One Older Child3 0.36 [88] 0.37 [195] 0.33 [167] 0.33 [349] 0.35 [410] 0.34 [311] 
At least 2 Older Children  0.17 [41] 0.14 [76] 0.10 [51] 0.11 [112] 0.10 [115] 0.09 [85] 
At least 1 Younger Child 0.50 [121] 0.47 [247] 0.50 [259] 0.52 [546] 0.53 [622] 0.54 [491] 
Biological/adoptive parents 0.80 [194] 0.79 [419] 0.82 [421] 0.77 [902] 0.75 [878] 0.73 [660] 
Single parent 0.14 [34] 0.15 [77] 0.14 [74] 0.15 [155] 0.17 [199] 0.18 [161] 
Step parent 0.06 [14] 0.06 [32] 0.04 [21] 0.08 [80] 0.08 [88] 0.09 [78] 
Not a large City (<500 000) 0.82 [198] 0.74 [393] 0.73 [377] 0.71 [736] 0.71 [834] 0.72 [651] 
Family total income 
(2001 $Canadian.) 
52,400 ± 
28,729 
54,201 ± 
32,832 
63,717 ± 
43,113 
65,060 ± 
42,108 
64,208 ± 
38,602 
65,867 ± 
38,942 
Notes: 1- The interpretation of each behavioral score is similar: the higher the score, the more the child is afflicted by 
the problem the score represents. 2- Percentage of observations and number of observations in brackets. 3- Includes 
children of the same age. 
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Table A2: Mean Characteristics of Children (7- to 15-year-olds), their PMK and their Family by 
Cycle, restricted sample 
Characteristics Cycle 1: 
1994-95 
Cycle 2: 
1996-97  
Cycle 3: 
1998-99 
Cycle 4: 
2000-01 
Cycle 5: 
2002-03 
Cycle 6: 
2004-05 
Sample 86 190 217 318 477 274 
Child             
Age in Months 133 ± 6 145 ± 13 145 ± 15 144 ± 14 145 ± 16 163 ± 9 
Behavioral scores1             
Hyperactivity 4.51 ± 3.93 3.71 ± 3.01 3.53 ± 3.20 3.27 ± 2.58 3.55 ± 2.51 3.34 ± 2.50 
Anxiety 3.24 ± 2.88 3.44 ± 2.89 3.22 ± 2.57 3.15 ± 2.48 2.98 ± 2.38 2.42 ± 2.27 
Aggression 1.16 ± 1.55 0.91 ± 1.70 0.89 ± 1.71 0.82 ± 1.55 0.99 ± 1.80 0.54 ± 1.16 
Repeated her last grade2 x3 0.05 [9] 0.04 [9] 0.06 [18] 0.07 [32] 0.05 [15] 
Changed school 0.21 [18] 0.11 [21] 0.11 [24] 0.13 [41] 0.13 [62] 0.07 [19] 
Is a girl 0.56 [48] 0.56 [106] 0.55 [119] 0.51 [161] 0.45 [217] 0.43 [119] 
Has a chronic condition  0.20 [17] 0.25 [48] 0.25 [55] 0.31 [99] 0.29 [137] 0.26 [71] 
PMK             
18 to 25 years old 0.23 [20] 0.23 [44] 0.24 [52] 0.22 [70] 0.20 [97] 0.19 [51] 
26 to 30 years old 0.40 [34] 0.40 [76] 0.42 [92] 0.44 [139] 0.44 [210] 0.46 [125] 
31 to 35 years old 0.30 [26] 0.29 [55] 0.28 [61] 0.30 [95] 0.29 [136] 0.27 [74] 
36 to 40 years old 0.07 [6] 0.08 [15] 0.06 [12] 0.04 [14] 0.07 [34] 0.09 [24] 
Primary Education 0.19 [16] 0.21 [39] 0.19 [41] 0.13 [41] 0.13 [61] 0.13 [35] 
Secondary Diploma 0.27 [23] 0.21 [39] 0.19 [41] 0.20 [64] 0.19 [93] 0.19 [52] 
Post-secondary 0.27 [23] 0.25 [48] 0.25 [55] 0.24 [75] 0.25 [119] 0.26 [72] 
University Diploma 0.28 [24] 0.34 [64] 0.37 [80] 0.43 [138] 0.43 [204] 0.42 [115] 
Non-Immigrant 1.00 [86] 0.99 [189] 0.99 [214] 0.98 [312] 0.98 [467] 0.98 [268] 
Family             
Family Functioning score 7.31 ± 5.37 8.02 ± 5.42 8.01 ± 4.30 8.12 ± 4.85 6.95 ± 4.78 7.21 ± 4.71 
One Older Child4 0.36 [31] 0.35 [66] 0.34 [74] 0.35 [110] 0.33 [157] 0.33 [90] 
At least 2 Older Children 0.17 [15] 0.15 [28] 0.12 [26] 0.11 [34] 0.08 [38] 0.05 [15] 
At least 1 Younger Child 0.49 [42] 0.49 [94] 0.43 [93] 0.53 [167] 0.59 [281] 0.60 [165] 
Biological/Adoptive parents 0.80 [69] 0.80 [152] 0.83 [180] 0.78 [248] 0.75 [358] 0.72 [197] 
Single parent 0.20 [17] 0.15 [29] 0.14 [31] 0.14 [43] 0.18 [88] 0.21 [58] 
Step parent 0.07 [6] 0.05 [9] 0.03 [7] 0.08 [26] 0.07 [35] 0.07 [20] 
Not a large City (<500 000) 0.78 [67] 0.75 [143] 0.76 [165] 0.73 [232] 0.75 [356] 0.75 [206] 
Family total income 
(2001 $Canadian) 
50,063 ± 
27,271 
52,503 ± 
29,533 
63,865 ± 
44,363 
68,194 ± 
46,337 
64,337 ± 
37,059 
61,935 ± 
34,088 
Notes: 1- The interpretation of each behavioral score is similar: the higher the score, the more the child is afflicted by 
the problem the score represents. 2- Percentage of observations and number of observations in brackets. 3- An X 
corresponds to a cell with less than five observations. 4- Includes children of the same age. 
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Table A3: Mean Math Standardized Test Score by Age and Cycle, Québec 
Cycle 1: 
1994-95 
Cycle 2: 
1996-97  
Cycle 3:  
1998-99 
Cycle 4:  
2000-01 
Cycle 5:  
2002-03 
Cycle 6:  
2004-05 
Age of 
Children 
Mean Score (Standard Deviation) [Number of observations] 
7 year olds 324 (46) [35] 336 (49) [39] 313 (35) [54] 301 (40) [174] - - 
8 year olds 365 (48) [59] 396 (47) [64] 368 (48) [88] 339 (52) [165] 346 (41) [194] - 
9 year olds 429 (53) [47] 448 (56) [88] 395 (41) [13] 399 (59) [166] 386 (46) [244] - 
10 year olds 496 (47) [53] 481 (48) [93] 474 (51) [59] 437 (54) [153] 427 (50) [175] 420 (54) [194] 
11 year olds 531 (55) [48] 514 (56) [83] 498 (47) [61] 476 (55) [101] 468 (56) [168] 441 (49) [226] 
12 year olds - 563 (60) [88] 527 (62) [83] 513 (52) [88] 500 (56) [141] 491 (68) [146] 
13 year olds - 608 (77) [76] 535 (58) [49] 552 (73) [83] 533 (69) [95] 520 (70) [140] 
14 year olds - - 640 (100) [56] 593 (102) [62] 575 (86) [80] 570 (88) [115] 
15 year olds - - 669 (101) [50] 607 (92) [50] 631 (91) [74] 612 (91) [83] 
Source: Author’s calculation from the weighted transversal micro-data sets of the NLSCY, cycles 1 to 6. 
Note: Number of observations in brackets 
 
Table A4: Standardized math scores of high school students in public schools by grade in Québec and 
in the other provinces 
Grade Québec Other provinces 
1 
2 
3 
4 
All 
514 
549 
595 
639 
559 
477 
515 
572 
600 
531 
Source: Authors’ calculation from the weighted transversal micro-data sets of the NLSCY, cycles 1 to 6. 
